Pharmacy Benefit Manager (PBM)

The Trump Administration’s latest effort to limit the power of pharmacy benefit managers (“PBMs”) is marred by economic uncertainty and looming legal scrutiny.  The Office of Inspector General (“OIG”) within the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) recently released a proposed rule (“proposed rule”) removing safe harbor protection under the Anti-Kickback Statute (“AKS”) for prescription drug rebates (“drug rebates) paid by a manufacturer to Medicare Part D plan sponsors and Medicaid managed care organizations (“MCOs”) or their PBMs.  The rule also creates new safe harbor protections for point-of-sale reductions in price and certain PBM services fees.[1]   The long-awaited proposed rule follows months of anticipation after the Trump Administration released its May 2018 Blueprint to reduce prescription drug costs.[2]

PBMs in Brief

PBMs, on behalf of health plans, employers, and other entities, negotiate and contract with drug manufacturers to obtain rebates on prescription drugs dispensed to health plan members.  By aggregating their collective scale and purchasing power of all health plan or employer group clients, PBMs can negotiate better deals with the manufacturer than any one plan or group operating independently.  Rebates are typically negotiated on brand-name drugs that compete with therapeutically-similar brands and generics. These retroactive rebates (after point-of-sale) are based on a multitude of factors, including a drug’s placement in a plan formulary designed by the PBM, and the PBM’s power to increase a manufacturer’s market share for specific drugs by inclusion on a formulary.  A manufacturer may provide a greater rebate if its product is included in a “preferred” position on the PBM formulary.

Recent press reports are speculating that CVS Health Corporation is seeking to acquire the health insurer Aetna.  The rumored transaction would create a new type of health care company that doesn’t currently exist:  one that combines a commercial health insurer with a retail pharmacy chain and a pharmacy benefit manager (PBM).  According to most reports, CVS would pay $66 – $70 billion to acquire Aetna (with Aetna stockholders receiving cash and CVS stock).  It’s said that the parties are trying to enter into a definitive agreement by year-end.    

The 2017 National Defense Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 114-328 (Dec. 23, 2016), introduces major changes to the Defense Department healthcare program known as TRICARE. By this time next year, we’ll see a new program to contain the cost of prescription drugs at retail pharmacies, contractual incentives for improving the quality of healthcare and…

This is the third article in our series on the effect of a “slow repeal” of the ACA. This week’s discussion focuses on the potential impact of a slow repeal of the ACA on the pharmaceutical industry (Pharma).

Unlike many of the players detailed in our prior articles on the slow repeal of the ACA, Pharma has not made a lot of noise regarding a repeal of the ACA. In fact, Pharma and biotech stocks soared—generally 3 percent to 10 percent—on November 8, 2016, largely because the industry had been preparing for a Clinton victory. A recent quote attributed to one Pharma industry official—“I actually think the Republican Party is a far less certain bet for the pharmaceutical industry”—reflects some of the unease surrounding the change in administration, and the likely repeal of the ACA.

A California federal court handed down a decision last Friday that may further influence how healthcare entities should approach the Telephone Consumer Protection Act’s (TCPA) “emergency purpose” exception as applied to calls or texts related to patient health and safety. In St. Clair v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., No. 16-CV-04911-VC, 2016 WL 7489047, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 30, 2016), the plaintiff alleged that CVS Pharmacy called him multiple times about his prescriptions after he told a customer representative that he no longer wished to be called. CVS moved to dismiss the lawsuit by claiming that all of the calls at issues fell under the emergency purpose exception contained in the statute, and therefore were not subject to the TCPA.

The U.S. Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) recently announced additional rule amendments intended to continue improving relations between the U.S. and Cuba by allowing even greater commerce and humanitarian efforts between the two countries. These new OFAC  and BIS  rules took effect last week.

The Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), which imposes a penalty of $500-$1,500 per violation for pre-recorded or auto-dialed calls to cell phones, contains two statutory exceptions to liability:

  • where the recipient of the call provided his or her prior express consent to be called, or
  • where the call was placed for an “emergency purpose.”

47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(1). While much attention has been focused on “consent,” the FCC’s definition of “emergency purpose” has remained relatively untested in TCPA litigation.

That landscape may be beginning to change. The federal district court’s recent decision in the putative class action lawsuit Roberts v. Medco Health Solutions, et al., No. 4:15 CV 1368 CDP (E.D. Mo., July 26, 2016) recognized that consistent with the FCC’s promulgated definition, the emergency purpose exception must be interpreted broadly to cover any calls that may affect the health and safety of a consumer.

The Orphan Drug Act aims to incentivize treatment of rare disorders or conditions affecting fewer than 200,000 persons in the United States through: (1) federal funding of grants and contracts to perform clinical trials of orphan products; (2) a tax credit of 50 percent of clinical testing costs; and (3) an exclusive right to market the orphan drug for approved orphan indications for 7 years from the date of marketing approval. While these financial incentives certainly make the business decision to engage in orphan drug development more palatable, the FDA does not approve orphan drugs on a separate pathway, despite the limited understanding of the diseases in question that presents developers of these drugs with problems stemming from small sample size and lack of well-defined efficacy endpoints.

Pfizer, Inc. recently petitioned the Supreme Court, seeking review of three companion decisions from the First Circuit Court of Appeals.  These decisions found against Pfizer and in favor of multiple third-party payors (TPPs)—the Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. (an HMO), Aetna, Inc. (a health insurer), and a putative class of employer health plans—on civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims for damages suffered due to Pfizer’s fraudulent marketing of off-label uses for the prescription drug Neurontin, an anti-convulsive approved for the treatment of epilepsy.  At the heart of the dispute is causation—the causal chain that runs from a drug manufacturer, such as Pfizer, to third-party payors of prescription drug benefits, such as HMOs, insurers and other health plans.

The First Circuit’s lead opinion—laying the common predicate necessary to understand each of the companion cases—came in the action brought against Pfizer by Kaiser, in which the court affirmed a $142 million jury award to the HMO.

The Development and Marketing of Neurontin

Neurontin was developed during the 1980s and early 1990s as an anti-epileptic drug.  In 1993, the Food and Drug Administration approved Neurontin for treatment of partial seizures in adults with epilepsy.  A campaign to market Neurontin for off-label conditions—conditions not included on the official label approved by the FDA—began in 1995.  These off-label conditions included neuropathic pain (pain from nerve damage), migraine headaches, and bipolar disorder.  Neurontin was marketed for treatment of these off-label conditions by way of, among other things:  (1) direct marketing to doctors, which misrepresented Neurontin’s effectiveness for off-label indications; (2) misleading information supplements and continuing medical education programs; and (3) articles published in medical journals that touted Neurontin’s off-label effectiveness but suppressed negative information about the drug.